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"In the wake of the shock of 13 days ago, many people will struggle to understand why terrorists hate the ideas America has championed around the world," Zoellick said. "It is inevitable that people will wonder if there are intellectual connections with others who have turned to violence to attack international finance, globalization, and the United States."
Zoellick's hardball tactics worked. President Bush, and President Bill Clinton before him, had tried in vain to renew fast track (now re-branded Trade Promotion Authority), which allows the Executive Branch to negotiate new deals that Congress must vote up or down. Anger over the negative impacts of existing pacts, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), on jobs and the environment had prevented both Presidents from obtaining this authority.
But the new "fight terrorism with trade" sales pitch helped turn the controversial trade bill into a test of wartime patriotism. It passed by one vote in the House of Representatives.
By fueling paranoia about free trade critics, Zoellick helped secure Department of Homeland Security funds to deploy 2,500 law enforcement personnel in Miami during trade talks in the fall of 2003. Police fired rubber bullets and tear gas at peaceful demonstrators, causing scores of injuries.
That same fall, Zoellick had aimed verbal bullets at developing country leaders who refused to embrace his trade agenda. In a Financial Times commentary, Zoellick accused Brazil, India and other key middle-income nations of employing the "rhetoric of resistance" and the "politics of protest." These countries had formed a bloc to persuade the United States to reduce its multi-billion dollar per year agricultural subsidies in exchange for other concessions.
Casting all pretense of diplomacy aside, Zoellick accused Brazil of being the leader of the "won't do" nations that were to blame for the collapse of World Trade Organization negotiations.
This time, the hardball approach didn't work as well. During his remaining year and a half as chief trade negotiator, Zoellick was unable to revive the WTO talks, which remain stalled today. His jabs at Brazil no doubt also contributed to the death of the hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Zoellick left his trade post for the State Department the same week that now-forgotten deal was due to be concluded.
Critics of corporate-driven trade agendas celebrated Zoellick's failures as a trade negotiator. Since he was deaf not only to the concerns of many developing country governments, but also to those of civil society groups in the United States and abroad, it was certainly preferable to have no deals than bad ones.
Sarah Anderson directs the Global Economy Project at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC, and was a staff member of the Congressionally appointed International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission (the Meltzer Commission). Article courtesy Foreign Policy in Focus
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