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What's At Stake In The Disputed Ukraine Election
by Roman Kupchinsky
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on Ukraine Election Crisis
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Unless
international outrage forces the Ukraine into another presidential runoff election, Viktor Yanukovych will soon assume leadership of a bitterly divided country. Pressure would be heavy to make good on some of his campaign
pledges, although some were unrealistic. Promises to increase government salaries and pensions would require flooding the economy with new currency (a Ukraine hryvnia is worth about 20 cents),
and unless he was willing to risk a major rise in inflation, such
economic promises would have to be shelved and more realistic measures
adopted.
His proposal for dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship would require a
change in the constitution, a difficult task under the best of
circumstances but an even more formidable one under the pall of
perceptions of electoral foul play.
In light of the furor it might cause amid postelection bitterness,
Yanukovych's advisers might well urge him to bury his divisive pledge to
make Russian the country's second official language.
Relations between these neighboring states could deteriorate to some
degree under a Yanukovych administration.
As for Yanukovych's foreign policy, the West and Russia would need to
carefully monitor his behavior on the following issues:
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Ukrainian-Russian relations
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The
hyperactivity of the Russian political establishment in promoting
Yanukovych is a debt that Yanukovych would be expected to repay in full.
Any future Ukrainian government would likely acquiesce to Russian
President Vladimir Putin's relentless drive to integrate large sectors
of the Ukrainian economy with Russia's.
One important factor in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship is more
difficult to decode: Does Yanukovych view himself as president of
Ukraine or as governor of the "South Russian gubernia" (territory)? Do the managers
of the Donetsk and other Ukrainian clans and financial-industrial groups
wish to see Russian ministers interfere in their business dealings?
Anatolii Chubais recently proffered a concept of Russian "liberal
imperialism," it should be kept in mind, which was not warmly received
by the Ukrainian political or business elite regardless of their support
or antipathy for Yanukovych.
The Single Economic Space (SES) would likely expand and become a more or
less permanent feature in the region. This body, created at President
Putin's initiative, seeks to first coordinate and then merge the
economic might of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan into what
some insist on calling a "customs union" or a "free trade zone" while
others see it as another example of Russian economic imperialism.
If a President Yanukovych did the unlikely and allowed Putin a free hand
in setting policy for the SES, the economic-imperialism view would
likely predominate and the Ukrainian economy would be seen as becoming
more beholden to Moscow. How this would affect potential investors is
difficult to gauge.
As it stands today, a great deal of Ukrainian economic growth is
dependent on cheap Russian and Turkmen energy resources. If Putin were
to play the "gas card," which he mistakenly did in the case of the much
more pro-Russian Belarus, a Yanukovych administration might respond in
kind and block the gas pipeline that supplies 90 percent of Russian gas
destined for Europe. By doing so, Ukraine could prevent billions of
dollars from going to the Russian treasury.
The chances of this taking place would be slim, however. In all
likelihood, a Yanukovych administration would be unlikely to veer far
from the policies set by its predecessor. Yanukovych would weave and bob
as the situation demanded in order to maintain a balance between
Ukrainian corporate interests and those of its Russian neighbors.
Nonetheless, Yanukovych would not be expected to undo deals such as the
one signed on November 16 whereby Russian state oil-pipeline company
Transneft assumed control over Ukraine's oil-pipeline system for 15 years.
He is also conscious of the fact that beginning in January 2005, Ukraine
will not be able to buy the 36 billion cubic meters of gas it needs
every year directly from Turkmenistan but rather must do so from Russian
Gazprom, in which the Russian state now holds a controlling stake.
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Ukrainian-U.S. relations
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Washington
would certainly take a dim view of the manner in which
Yanukovych was elected. His victory, however, might not have any great
impact on relations between the two countries, given that relations were
already visibly strained during the last five years of the Kuchma
administration. Kuchma's alleged intention to sell an advanced radar
system to Iraq, the still-unsolved murder of Internet journalist Heorhiy
Gongadze, the reversal of the Odessa-Brody pipeline -- all have served to
isolate Ukraine in Washington's eyes.
Ukrainian military participation in Iraq was meant to pacify the United
States and rehabilitate Ukraine in the eyes of the Washington. Moscow
understood this and did not protest when Ukrainian forces were
dispatched to Iraq. Yanukovych has promised to withdraw this contingent
and would likely keep that pledge.
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The rise of the Donetsk clan
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There
can be little doubt that the strength and power of the Donetsk
clan, the informal group of individuals and companies that controls much
of industrial and financial life in the Donetsk region, would grow
immeasurably under a Yanukovych administration. The old adage that "Kiev
makes policy while Donetsk makes money" is no longer accurate: Donetsk
now makes both, and anyone who challenges this postulate might find
himself in serious trouble.
The rise of the Donetsk clan would clearly affect Ukrainian steel and
rolled-pipe exports to Russia, the largest buyer of those commodities.
It is projected that by 2020, Russia will need to build up to 27,000
kilometers of new, large-diameter gas pipeline. Many of the enterprises
that construct those items are controlled by the Donetsk clan and Viktor
Pinchuk, a parliamentarian and outgoing President Kuchma's son-in-law,
through his Interpipe group. This would help temper Russians from using
the "energy card" against Ukraine.
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Ukrainian-Polish relations
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Relations
between these neighboring states could deteriorate to some
degree under a Yanukovych administration. The Industrial Union of the
Donbas has been involved in a dispute with Polish authorities over its
desire to buy the Huty Stali Czestochowa steel mill due to Polish
resistance to sell them that valuable asset. Yanukovych would likely
lobby on behalf of the Industrial Union of the Donbas and risk being
rejected in order to prove his loyalty to the Donetsk Clan.
Yet it is unlikely that Yanukovych would turn away from Poland
altogether, given that Poland might remain his only open window to the
West and Ukraine's only backer of the country's eventual EU membership.
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Transparency and civil society
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The
rise of the Donetsk clan, many of whose cadres might be appointed to
senior posts in a Yanukovych administration, would signal few advances
for legality and rule of law in Ukraine in the coming five years. A clan
purportedly built on violence, assassination, and ruthlessness could
hardly be expected to bolster civil society.
Transparency would thus remain a largely alien concept in Ukraine.
In practical terms, law enforcement would thus remain largely under the
control of the presidential administration, "guidance" of the press
would remain the norm, and the scandals of the Kuchma administration
might go unpunished.
The question of Ukrainian membership of NATO and the European Union saw
little forward movement during the Kuchma years, and would be unlikely
to gather momentum under Yanukovych. It should be noted that at least
some of the motivation for keeping Ukraine isolated from the West lies
in NATO and the European Union not wishing to upset Russia.
Russia by and large maintained official silence during deliberations on
EU and NATO expansion, but Moscow was always present in the minds of
Europeans eager to avoid angering their major supplier of energy by
getting too cozy with Ukraine.
© 2004 RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org Comments? Send a letter to the editor.Albion Monitor
November 25, 2004 (http://www.albionmonitor.com)All Rights Reserved. Contact rights@monitor.net for permission to use in any format. |
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