by Sunil Sharma |
|
Much ado
has been made in the press and academic discussions about how
Richard Holbrooke has been a force for peace in the Yugoslavia imbroglio.
The reality behind Holbrooke's activities in the former Yugoslavia has been
excellently exposed in recent issues of Covert Action Quarterly and
elsewhere by journalist and Yugoslavia expert Diana Johnstone.
A little-known chapter in Holbrooke's career in the U.S. government is his complicity in Indonesia's campaign of genocide against East Timor. Holbrooke was head of the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Carter Administration. On December 7, 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor, which it continues to occupy today, killing over 200,000 Timorese in the process -- approximately one-third of pre-invasion population. The U.S. supported Indonesia in ways which are already well known; there is no doubt that the invasion, ongoing occupation, and genocide could not have been possible without U.S. support.
|
|
Following
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, the U.S. imposed an arms ban on
Indonesia from December 1975 to June 1976. The ban was a secret. In fact the
ban was so secret that the Indonesians were unaware of it. The fraud was
later exposed by Cornell University professor Benedict Anderson in his
testimony before Congress in February 1978. Anderson cited a report,
"confirmed from the Department of Defense printout", showing that there
never was an arms ban, and that during the period of the alleged ban the U.S.
initiated new offers of military weaponry to the Indonesians:
If we are curious as to why the Indonesians never felt the force of the U.S. government's "anguish," the answer is quite simple. In flat contradiction to express statements by General Fish, Mr. Oakley and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke, at least four separate offers of military equipment were made to the Indonesian government during the January-June 1976 "administrative suspension." This equipment consisted mainly of supplies and parts for OV-10 Broncos, Vietnam War era planes designed for counterinsurgency operations against adversaries without effective anti-aircraft weapons, and wholly useless for defending Indonesia from a foreign enemy. The policy of supplying the Indonesian regime with Broncos, as well as other counterinsurgency-related equipment hascontinued without substantial change from the Ford through the present Carter administrations.Indeed, by late 1977 the Indonesians literally began to run out of weapons in its campaign to destroy the Timorese. The Carter Administration stepped in and increased military aid and weapons sales to the Indonesians, which resulted in Indonesia's stepped up campaigns of 1978 to 1980 when the level of killing reached genocidal levels. When asked by Australian reporters at a press conference about atrocities in East Timor, Holbrooke answered, "I want to stress I am not remotely interested in getting involved in an argument over the actual number of people killed. People were killed and that always is a tragedy but what is at issue is the actual situationin Timor today . . . [Asked about how many Timorese were killed in the past] . . . we are never going to know anyway." The date of this press conference was April 6, 1977. Holbrooke would most certainly have been aware that a few days earlier (April 1) the Melbourne Age quoted Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik as saying that "50,000 people or perhaps 80,000 might have been killed during the war in Timor, but we saved 600,000 of them." Also on April 1, the Canberra Times quoted Malik as saying, "The total may be 50,000, but what does this mean if compared with 600,000 people who want to join Indonesia? [sic] Then what is the big fuss. It is possible that they may have been killed by the Australians and not us. Who knows? It was war." Malik's claim that perhaps 10 percent of the Timorese population may have been killed in less than two years was a bit much for the U.S: Australian state radio reported, "The State Department is clearly embarrassed by Adam Malik's statement that the number killed in East Timor might have been as high as 80,000." Fortunately, the State Department could rely on the U.S. media's silence to spare them from any embarrassment here at home.
|
|
In
September 1978, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Edward Masters went to East
Timor accompanied by an entourage of Indonesian diplomats. While there,
Masters visited refugee camps -- really concentration camps -- that the
Timorese had been herded into by the Indonesians and then subjected to a
forced starvation policy. According to one U.S. reporter who was there,
Masters "came away so shocked by the conditions of the refugees that they
immediately contacted the governor of East Timor . . . to explore the
possibilities for providing foreign humanitarian assistance." However, it
would not be until a full nine months had passed that Masters (in June 1979)
would urge the U.S. to provide humanitarian assistance. The timing of Masters'
silence coincided with Indonesia being bolstered by a huge shipment of U.S.
military aid and weapons described above. As Benedict Anderson told Congress
in 1980:
In other words, for nine long months, from September 1978 to June 1979, while "in ever increasing numbers the starving and the ailing, wearing rags at best, drifted onto the coastal plain," Ambassador Masters deliberately refrained, even within the walls of the State Department, from proposing humanitarian aid to East Timor. Until the generals in Jakarta gave him the green light, Mr. Masters did nothing to help the East Timorese, although Mr. Holbrooke insists that "the welfare of the Timorese people is the major objective of our policy towards East Timor.Despite the fact that the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor was and is an egregious violation of international law and an act of genocide, the Carter administration and Holbrooke in particular, while acknowledging that the East Timorese had not been allowed to carry out an act of self-determination, regarded the situation as a fait accompli. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who at the time was the U.S. ambassador to the UN, boasted in his memoirs that he effectively prevented the UN from implementing resolutions calling on Indonesia to withdraw immediately from Timor and which affirmed the Timorese people's right to self-determination. "The United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about," he wrote. "The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success." The State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs was Holbrooke's fiefdom. While the State Department made great efforts to interview Cambodian refugees in order to assess the level of human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge, the opposite was true of Timorese refugees who were easily accesible in Australia and Portugal. A Christian Science Monitor article from 1980 on East Timor and the State Department's indifference to the plight of the Timorese is worth quoting at length: Francisco Fernandes, a Roman Catholic priest who served for several years as head of the Timorese refugee community, said he knew of no attempt by U.S. officials to seek out and interview any of the more than 2,000 such refugees who have been living in Portugal for the past several years. |
|
All of this
stands in stark contrast to Holbrooke's impassioned defense of
the right of the Kosovo Albanians to "autonomy." Perhaps he has had some
kind of religious conversion in recent years.
The Carter Administration position on Indonesia and East Timor was best summed up by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke in June, 1980 Congressional testimony: The situation in East Timor is one of the number of very important concerns of the United States in Indonesia. Indonesia, with a population of 150 million people, is the fifth largest nation in the world, is a moderate member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is an important oil producer -- which plays a moderate role within OPEC -- and occupies a strategic position astride the sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. President Suharto and other prominent Indonesian leaders have publicly called for the release of our hostages in Iran. Indonesia's position within the Association of South East Asian Nations -- ASEAN -- is also important and it has played a central role in the supporting Thailand and maintaining the security of Thailand in the face of Vietnam's destabilizing actions in Indo-China [sic]. Finally, Indonesia has provided humane treatment for over 50,000 Indo-Chinese refugees and taken the initiative in offering an island site as an ASEAN refugee processing centre. Indonesia is, of course, important to key U.S. allies in the region, especially Japan and Australia. We highly value our cooperative relationship with Indonesia.If there was a world in which an International Court of Justice had any meaning, Richard Holbrooke's shameful service to State power would surely be characterized as a series of Crimes Against Humanity. For now, such a thought is merely a fantasy for those of us who seek peace and justice.
Albion Monitor
April 19, 1999 (http://www.monitor.net/monitor) All Rights Reserved. Contact rights@monitor.net for permission to use in any format. |