To Iraq Rebels, Defeating Constitution Same As Beating U.S.

by Ferry Biedermann

(IPS) BEIRUT -- Disagreement over wording of Iraq's new constitution, mainly between the Shias and the Sunnis, has been blamed for increasing tensions. But there is ample evidence that militants are targeting the very idea of a new constitution, rather than its content.

Each new incident makes it harder for representatives of the two groups to compromise on the draft. This is particularly so after the stampede that killed close to a thousand Shia pilgrims in Baghdad last week.

News that the criminal trial of deposed dictator Saddam Hussein is to start in October, when the referendum on the constitution is also to be held, is bound to increase tensions. Many Sunnis, who now feel increasingly marginalized, still see him as their champion.

But negotiations are still going on and may yet succeed in addressing the worst fears of the Sunnis who oppose the proposed constitution. The main stumbling block remains federalism under which regions would have greater autonomy. Two of the three main population groups, the Shias and the Kurds, agree on this, but the idea is still largely opposed by the Sunnis, sometimes vehemently.

Iraqi politicians have disagreed on whether the draft can still be amended in the run-up to the referendum on its approval next month. It has, after all, been passed by parliament.

The Americans who have been closely involved in the drafting process and some of their allies argue that the "editing" needed to arrive at the final wording still leaves some room for maneuvering.

Wrangling over the constitution has been invested with a whole lot of meaning by different people. The Bush administration, which is increasingly giving the impression that it is looking for a quick exit from Iraq, has tried to spin it as a celebration of democracy. Some in the antiwar movement have warned that it will lead to the break-up of the country.

But it is seems much more likely that all parties will muddle on and that a low-level civil war that is already a reality in parts of the country will continue at least until the central government has the military wherewithal to impose order.

The Iraqi government and the U.S. administration have voiced the hope that a successful political process will reduce violence. They say a drying up of support for militants among the Sunni population is particularly significant.

Conversely, failure to agree on the constitution is seen as likely to deepen the Sunni-Shia divide and lead to more sectarian violence, with some Sunnis feeling more disenfranchized and more inclined to resort to violence.

The latter may be true only to a certain extent. The militants and their political cheerleaders will of course use the clash over the constitution to drum up support. But they will likely keep doing this regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.

The aim of the militants is not a better deal for the Sunnis, nor is it a fully democratic Iraq. Both these objectives could have been furthered by participation of Sunnis in the January elections, during which the militants enforced a boycott in Sunni areas.

Many Sunnis genuinely feel that they will be frozen out of the oil riches of the country, and that they will lose territory both to the Kurds and the Shias, which would leave them poor, landlocked and marginalized. These are not imaginary fears because when they were in power, Sunnis too applied the maxim of winner-take-all, in line with practice throughout the region.

It should be up to the Americans to make the other two groups moderate their demands. But the intensity of Sunni feeling against the invasion makes this difficult. The Kurds are a main pillar of support for the Americans. U.S. authorities do have some sway over Kurds, but are loath to push them too far. In the event that Iraq does come apart, Kurds will be the only ones the Americans could still count on.

The United States finds Shias hard to influence. They tend to be more open to suggestions from Tehran. The Shias welcomed the invasion that delivered them from Saddam Hussein's oppression, and that promised to deliver the country into their hands since they form the majority. But they are much less beholden to the United States and are ideologically much further removed from the Americans than the Kurds.

Sectarian violence did not start with the divisions over the new constitution, nor did it start with the U.S. invasion. The Sunni-dominated center dealt harshly with the rebellious Kurds and sometimes mutinous Shias, particularly since the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.

The forces that were pulling Iraq apart were present and responsible for thousands of deaths long before the Americans arrived. A federal constitution may be just what the country needs to put a stop to that.

But that does not interest the militants whose only objective now is to make the U.S. venture in Iraq fail, even if it is at the price of making Iraq itself fail.

Given the American failures during and after the war and their continuing inability to come to terms with the situation, it might be best for Iraq if the United States admitted defeat and left.

The price that the Sunnis will then exact from the Kurds and the Shias and vice-versa will at some point lead to some kind of equilibrium. This is more than can be expected from the current, probably short-lived process.