U.S. Positioned To Control Most Oil In Central Asia

by MB Naqvi

(IPS) KARACHI -- South Asia has decided to enter the big league of nations struggling to secure oil and natural gas supplies that are not yet under the sole superpower's control.

The rate at which the United States is acquiring control over the vast deposits of hydrocarbons in former Soviet Central Asian republics was highlighted by the recent commissioning of a new pipeline to take oil from the Caucasus directly to Europe, bypassing the two older Russian-controlled pipelines: one in the north directly from Russia to Europe, and the second from Baku to Turkey through the Black Sea and busy Straits of Bosphorous.

All Middle East oil is under tight U.S. control, except that of insurgent Iraq and Iran.

India, with a rapidly expanding economy, is anxious to conclude an agreement with Iran for assured gas supplies via an overland pipeline through Pakistan. The idea originated in Iran, which is in the midst of a serious 25-year-old rift with Washington, which has tried to isolate the nation that President Bush labeled a member of the "axis of evil."

Both India and Pakistan responded positively to the Iranian idea; indeed Pakistan showed keenness to join the project, hoping to be able to charge transit fees.

Both nations initially seemed not to have taken U.S. opposition to the project into their calculations. That hostility came into full view last March when Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice termed the project "not a good idea for Pakistan."

India appears to have rejected the U.S. dislike of this proposal on the grounds of necessity: their burgeoning energy needs require a secure supply source. Originally enthusiastic, Pakistan cooled toward the project. But Indian Petroleum Minister Manishankar Aiyar visited Islamabad last week and persuaded Pakistan to endorse the Indo-Iranian deal.

Pakistan's climbing on the project's bandwagon was not single-minded: it also adopted the policy of welcoming all schemes to transport oil in any shape through pipelines. India too has begun showing lively interest in two other pipeline projects.

Although this new approach has actually considerably diluted enthusiasm in the original Indo-Pakistani-Iranian gas pipeline, both countries continue to say they will ignore U.S. objections and remain committed to the gas project. That raises questions.

Washington has minced no words in opposing the project. It has good relations with both India and Pakistan. While the United States is assiduously wooing India, promising to help make it a global power, it heavily depends on Pakistan for the conduct of its "war on terror," to fight al-Qaeda and to win peace in Afghanistan.

But Pakistani-U.S. relations also include Karachi's various vulnerabilities; indeed Pakistan's prosperity, illustrated by GDP growth of 7 to 8 percent, is sustained mainly by U.S. aid, goodwill and help in sharply reducing its debt-servicing burden.

From various angles, the gas pipeline project looks wobbly, though the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi are upbeat for the record.

Two other pipeline projects are being actively discussed in Pakistan. One is for oil to be brought from Sharjah under Persian Gulf waters through a pipeline. U.S. interests seem to have some minor share in the project.

The other plan is a major three-country project: hydrocarbons will be sourced in Turkmenistan and carried through a pipeline to Afghanistan and Pakistan's newest port at Gawadar to be exported to the rest of the world. The company that will set up the pipeline and manage distribution of these hydrocarbons is a composite subsidiary of major U.S. oil corporations, so it is not surprising that Washington is keen that this project should be implemented and succeed.

When and if this UNOCAL project -- intended to transport as many hydrocarbons from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Khyrghistan and Kazakhstan as possible -- succeeds, the United States may have attained its objective of acquiring effective control over most of the oil of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia.

Russia is not involved in UNOCAL or the new pipeline from Baku to the Turkish port via Georgia.

Of course the pipeline projects illustrate the pure geopolitical rivalry between the world's hyper-power and the two giants of Asia: Russia and China. Both the latter are trying to win over the rulers of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Khyrghistan to their side and to meet their fuel needs on a secure permanent basis.

What the final upshot of this struggle will be cannot be foreseen. All that can be said is that, as of now, the United States is way ahead of its chief rivals.

China is also trying to woo India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, even Nepal and Burma, to replicate the relative success of its diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Beijing's ability to stay on good terms with authoritarian rulers can stand it in good stead in all Southern Asian regions.

Much will depend on how the three major crises are resolved or when push comes to shove: over North Korea's nuclear weapons, on Taiwan, and, indeed, Iran. With the passage of time, the danger of war over these hot spots decreases, though what the Israeli lobby, neo-conservatives and hawks can do to make or unmake U.S. Asian policies remains uncertain.

And after what has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan to a smaller extent, nothing definite can be said.

One thing is certain, though. The U.S.-favored UNOCAL pipeline has to run the gauntlet of a growing guerrilla war in Afghanistan and an unpredictable law-and-order situation in Pakistani Balochistan. Even the Iranian pipeline will have to traverse, west-east, the same Balochistan.

The law-and-order situation in that region can, however, vastly improve if good governance and political 'savoir faire' can be brought to bear on it. The Afghanistan situation cannot be said to be as amenable to improvement as Pakistan's because the continued presence of U.S. and other foreign troops -- vital to the survival of the Karzai regime -- is an incitement to rebellion.

The crisis over Iran casts a long shadow on all the three proposed pipelines: from Iran, Sharjah, and Turkmenistan. The economics of the Sharjah pipeline is likely to knock it out of the running. Any U.S. intervention in Iran would create a situation like 15 or 20 Iraqs. Nothing can be said about the future in that case.

But geo-strategic struggles need not always demand wars: diplomacy backed by plenty of dollars -- an art in which the United States excels -- can do wonders, though dollars alone cannot decide the outcome of titanic geo-political struggles among Washington, Russia and China.

At some stage, Europe and Japan will also actively enter the new Great Game in Asia, making it even more complex.