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The Rumsfeld Tapes: Bob Woodward Interview, The Ultimatum Period


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Could you go through that because that's incredibly important -- because it's clear from the reporting that there were all kinds of briefings and summaries and re-briefings?

The topics run the gamut, but you don't have any years on here interestingly. What year would that be? [Aide Lt. Gen. John Craddock: "That would be '02."]

That would be '02. [Aide Lt. Gen. John Craddock: "Yes, Sir, 2002."]

Well, they started before then.

Okay. This is what?

This is a timeline that -- the President was in the process of negotiating with the UN and sending signals to Saddam Hussein the things he ought to stop doing and he ought to cooperate with the UN, and toward the end that he ought to leave, the ultimatum period. And I kept -- my task was to have to link all of the complex things that were going on in the world and that would affect the President's timing in the event he decided to go. And what needed to be done prior to that and how long would things take not knowing if he wanted to go to -- if he would ultimately feel he had to go to war, I had to be prepared and be able to tell him so his body language and his words fit the circumstance of what was going on. And so we had -- this one, for example, is from January 29th.

Of '03.

Of '03. But they go back before and they come closer to the very end. They get shorter and shorter toward the end, but this one had that there was a Prime Minister of Italy visit to D.C., there was a Prime Minister of the UK visit to D.C. on the 31st, the UN is getting organized, Germany assumes the Presidency, European Summit of Foreign Ministers, Sec State presents the case to the UN Security Council.

That's February 5th.

The 4th I got. Yeah we -- he -- presents the case -- here it is on the 5th. President speaks to the world and says, you've heard the inspectors and so forth and this was dated -- this was back on January 29th, and it was projecting how it might go. And then it would have something like this: U.S. teams go to allied capitals and to Congress and begin talking about what the inspectors are doing -- or not doing, finding. Then the Sec State submits the second resolution, the 4th ID ships begin to arrive in the Med. And Turkey...

What is the date on that? On the 4th ID?

The 10th of February. And then we had a date Turkey will be addressing their decision whether ground forces can go through or whether they have to go around. And then an end day, a Presidential decision day.

When was that date on there?

Well it moved and on each one of these it moved.

When was it on that one? February 22nd is that?

That's February 22nd on that one and that's a January 29th one and this one is a March 13th one and we dropped the phrase N-Day. Here's where we had to have CRAF 2 [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] might have to activated. U.S. announces coalition of the willing, CRAF 2. And then there's Ashura -- the end of the 10-day Shia holy period -- and then U.S. government gives coalition, allies and Congress notice of impending ultimatum. Ultimatum day -- and I had to finally put "to be decided" because it was moving -- all these things were moving around. And then we ended up with an "A" day, which is -- well, then there was a period we put coalition and some Special Operators on the ground, and then there was "A" day when the air war began.

And was on that one "A" day the 21st or...?

It was in that range, but I didn't have a date on this, it's not the latest one. We ought to get -- well these are all fascinating. But I ended up having to do this myself because I was the only one talking to the President.

You had to bring all the pieces together.

Yeah, and he was talking to me about what he was thinking and what he might have to do, but to know -- he needs to know how all these other pieces would fit with him.

And you would go over that with him each period or each day?

We ended up with hours because it all had to be sequenced and we did it, we did. Now this is the list.

And where is it? [Aide Lt. Gen. John Craddock: "It goes back to May of '02."]

Oh look at this. Okay, here it is. Here is the first briefing that I've got down here where there was a specific briefing. What was your first date? You said -- Crawford was when?

Crawford was the 28th of December 2001 and I think that would be on Franks.

[Aide Lt. Gen. John Craddock: "Well these are briefings about the plan after the plan was developed and as it progressed."]

May 11th I have was Franks to Camp David with the President and the NSC.

Well let me read you these titles...May 11th '02 was "General" and it was at Camp David and June 19th was a compartmented concept paper, August 5th was --

And that was -- is there anymore on what that is? I'm sorry to interrupt but I have June 19th introducing the concept of the running start to the President.

And then August 5th was updates and targets -- and that was Franks and me at the White House. And then September 6th was threat analysis, September 6th was WMD and theater ballistic missiles, September 7th was the plan air, ground, SOF, Information Ops at Camp David and then October 29th was Info Ops, WMD theatre ballistic missiles waived, SAP [Special Access Programs] program, Franks at the White House Sit Room. And then December 4th '02 was operations in Baghdad, Iraqi operations, preparations and sustaining momentum at the White House with Franks. September 18th was DoD, CIA Strategic Integration for Operations in Iraq. The 19th was campaign overview and strategic timing pursuit of al-Qaeda senior leadership. The 20th was securing and repairing Iraqi oil infrastructure, collateral damage estimates, hardened and underground facilities, targeting for OP Plan 1003 Victor, Iraqi hydrology update. January 8th was Desert Badger update and 1003 Victor force deployment. The 10th of January global impacts, regional country support. The 10th was importance of the North. The 15th was U.S. policy on Israel and plans to implement DoD planning to deter and defend against Iraqi WMD. The 17th of January was U.S. NorthCom support to the war in Iraq -- what you do in terms of homeland? These are all briefings we've got on file.

To the President?

They're all to the President, every one of these.

He really had his hands in it didn't he? Keep going if you are willing to.

Then the 27th we briefed him on Korea update. And on the 31st a timeline -- that would be one of these things I just showed you.

That's January 31st.

January 31st -- and also targeting and operational objectives -- and that's me and Myers I'm sure. And the 31st on intelligence surveillance and the reconnaissance, collection options. And then on the 5th a timeline again of March and then on the 12th -- correction that was February and on February 12th military response to suspect al-Qaeda facility in Iraq. On the 14th, Free Iraqi Forces status. On the 14th, catastrophic success -- what you do if it collapsed and things went fast in terms of humanitarian things and the like. The 19th, a timeline again, potential Iraqi-related briefings, targeting approval authority, where we actually agreed as to what targets he would deal with, what targets I would deal with, what targets Tom would deal with. Targeting and collateral damage on the 19th; 2/25 -- human shields, possible U.S. responses; 2/25 -- swift defeat -- that's different, 2/25 -- Operation Southern Watch concept of operations, rules of engagement; 2/26 -- Northern Operations, operations in Baghdad; 2/28 -- Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance; 3/5 -- Special Access Programs and Approval Authorities. March 5th -- conventional response to Iraqi WMD attack; March 5th -- combat operation timelines again -- Franks was with me on this one. March 5th -- status update on initial combat operations, Franks was with me for that. The next one -- reshaping the Iraqi military. Another is targeting and collateral damage on the 24th with Myers and me. So it's those kind of things that was long, long list of and here are the ones we didn't get in here for some reason -- Reserve call-ups, briefings, congressional contact plans, Fortress Baghdad, legal basis, CENTCOM-CIA synchronization, high risk operations, oil field security and repair, targeting on collateral damage. Hydrology -- I guess I did mention some of those -- humanitarian and Civic Affairs, global impacts I mentioned, post conflict governance, chem and bio warfare impact on coalition forces, strategic information operations, declaratory policy -- that's what that means, global logistics and medical preparedness. These are not to the President.

Those were all to the President?

No. Some were just to the -- oh, strategic operations was to the President, NSC. Global logistics was just to the Deputies, opposition strategy was to the NSC, catastrophic success I mentioned, oil production sales was to the NSC. Yeah, they're just one after another, after another. Some were to him, some were to the NSC, some were to be PC and the DC.


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Albion Monitor April 26, 2004 (http://www.albionmonitor.net)

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