Pakistan In Bind Over Fighting Islamic Militants

by M B Naqvi

(IPS) KARACHI -- The Pakistan government has offered yet another amnesty to ''foreign Islamic militants'' in the country's northwestern tribal areas, meaning al-Qaeda elements, if they surrender by April 20. But in truth, authorities find themselves between a rock and a hard place in the military offensive against these fighters.

It is proceeding on two separate fronts. First, it has assured tribal leaders in North and South Waziristan that Islamabad wants to abide by the area's tribal customs and allow the tribes, using their own volunteer forces, to deliver on foreign militants surrendering with their arms.

The Pakistani government, for its part, guarantees that the surrendering militants will not be handed over to another country and can live in tribal areas if other tribal members give assurances that they will not use Pakistan territory to raid another country.

Second, Pakistan's military is said to be closing in on another inaccessible town, Shawal, in North Waziristan.

Intelligence services appear to have scented the presence of Osama bin Laden himself, though most commentators dismiss the idea that he would patiently await the arrival of Pakistani troops in coordination with U.S.-led troops on the Afghan side of the border to implement their ''hammer and anvil'' strategy. Bin Laden is more likely to change his abode at the first rumour of his enemy's movements, if indeed he is really in the region..

But already, Pakistani authorities find themselves in a fix, caught between U.S. pressure and domestic constraints.

Islamabad is under obligation to pursue them in the mountainous tribal areas. Washington too wants Pakistan to do much more than it has done. This is causing bad blood on both sides. The U.S. government thinks that President Gen Pervez Musharraf, is half-hearted and fears the backlash from tribesmen and maybe, his own main constituency: the army.

Yet Pakistani authorities believe they have done the most they could. U.S. officials are too suave to show irritation or annoyance. But U.S. media outfits do.

Although the Bush administration has granted major non-NATO ally status to Pakistan and has accepted at face value Musharraf's explanation for a key official's admission of nuclear proliferation, there is, underneath all this, much wariness in the U.S. government.

In March, Pakistan's army and paramilitary mounted a 10-day military expedition in South Waziristan Agency's Wana area, in search of a ''high-value'' fugitive there. Militarily, the expedition was a failure -- and there is egg on the generals' faces.

There were more than 100 casualties, 60 of them on military's side, though they have arrested over 160 tribesmen, some of them suspected of harbouring al-Qaeda and Taliban people. But no ''high-value'' fugitive was caught.

Indeed, except for some Chinese Uighurs, most other fugitives managed to escape through the tunnels that were later discovered by the authorities.

The expedition divided Pakistani officialdom right down the middle. The traditional wisdom, dating to British administrators, was that the tribal areas should be dealt with discreetly. In the past too, military force was to be used sparingly and under well-judged circumstances mainly as punishment for anti-British activities.

Tribesmen have traditionally regarded their area to be independent of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, though they have also traditionally respected the superiority of British, now Pakistan, army, accepting certain administrative arrangements with them.

Under this set-up, they were to be governed by their own customary laws, with justice being administered by 'jirgas' or assembly of notables, with political officers acting more as influential ambassadors than anything else. Their modus operandi was to bribe the tribesmen who were, and are, desperately poor, though well-armed.

The legacy of 10 years of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan is to be found in these areas, awash with modern Russian small arms. Colonial historians have painted the frontier tribesmen as romantic figures: He is an excellent sniper and survives on virtual nothing and fights fiercely. He has an elaborate code of honour called 'pakhtoonwali'.

This code makes Pashtuns the world's most hospitable people and once they extend protection to anyone, they would protect the person to the very last bullet. It is just not conceivable they will hand over anyone in their protection. The normal machinery of government does not operate in these areas.

There is a complication: their political sympathies lie with the Taliban primarily and to al-Qaeda secondarily. These sympathies may be another reason not to hand over Islamic militants under their protection.

Likewise, al-Qaeda notables pay for protection well by local standards, at the rate of $100 - 250 a week. All these are solid reasons why Islamabad faced tough opposition in Wana.

Since the last operation, military reinforcements have been dispatched. The military is using what political savvy it has. Of course, more money will be spent on tribal leaders, along with tough talk of new operations if things do not work out.

The time available for negotiation is not much before the generals may have to mount another expedition. But the biggest factor that worries Washington and Islamabad is the Pakistan Army's own discipline.

The army under previous military dictator Gen. Ziaul Haq had tried to change its ethos, especially its self-image, from a modern standing army to an Islamic one. He changed its motto to faith, piety and 'jihad' for godly purposes. If the Taliban or al-Qaeda were ever to organise an army, they would not be able to improve on this motto.

Zia's efforts were not futile. Nobody knows for sure, but a proportion of officers now regard themselves as a true Islamic army. As for the army's rank and file, their ethos in any case was always deeply coloured by faith. The top leadership is certainly modernist, though some U.S. officials suspect that even at the top there may be a few individuals who are Islamicists. It would therefore be reasonable to fear a backlash.

Doubtless, the Pakistan army is still a disciplined force. Musharraf has nothing to worry about in terms of general policy directions. But can he make the army enthusiastic in pursuing those whom its soldiers regard as fighters for Islamic piety and those resisting invading infidels in Islamic Afghanistan?

This is the major worry in Washington as well as in Islamabad.