Following the money trail in Iraq
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In
this same light, consider events in Iraq, where our press continues to focus on the crisis of "turning over sovereignty" to an expanded, largely American-appointed body (not even subject to the abstruse caucus process the CPA had previously proposed). There, you can see rather clearly, even if most of our press cannot, a second-term process just under the surface of events. On that surface, the Americans have turned, at first reluctantly, to the UN and Kofi Annan for help; have called on NATO for aid; are welcoming Japanese and soon South Korean troops into the country; are attempting to mollify Ayatollah Sistani; and are half-publicly discussing withdrawal strategies. But in the last week, two news items caught my eye and a third item was on my mind, all concerning the way in which we were actually hunkering down in Iraq:
"After a power struggle with the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon has won control over most of an $18.4 billion aid package for Iraq, and rebuilding delayed for a month will start this week, U.S. officials in Baghdad said Sunday. Much of the enormous aid package -- funded by U.S. taxpayers -- will go toward 2,300 construction projects over the next four years. Of these, the State Department will oversee as little as 10 percent. But $4 billion of the aid package has been set aside, and spending authority for those funds is still in discussion. Now, the resolution means the U.S. military will have chief control over rebuilding in Iraq, even after its command of the U.S.-led occupation ends, officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity."
Note that, as now planned, on June 30, "sovereignty" will theoretically be handed back to the Iraqis; the occupation of Iraq will "end"; relations between the new temporary ruling body and the United States will be reconstituted on a state-to-state basis through - again theoretically - the State Department, which is to oversee the largest embassy in the world somewhere in Baghdad's Green Zone. That's how the story goes anyway, but the money trail, as Krane indicates, leads elsewhere and tells quite a different story -- a tale, in fact, in which the civilians at the top of the Pentagon aren't about to let go of the vast flow of reconstruction dollars heading Iraqwards, and so of Iraq itself.
Let's remember that the Pentagon aced the State Department and all its planners and Arabists out of any role in the postwar occupation and then proceeded to run one of the most ill-conceived, militarized experiments in "nation-building" imaginable. Now under fire in our media, in Congress, and elsewhere, and hemorrhaging in the country itself, its key officials nonetheless remain both determined to, and bureaucratically positioned to take hold of the vast monies Congress has appropriated for Iraqi reconstruction and run up to 90% of the show into the foreseeable future, "sovereignty" or no. For as Krane puts it, and as the money trail indicates, "By summer, the flow of dollars is expected to turn Iraq into one of the world's largest construction sites" -- a construction site that will be overseen by the Pentagon.
So much for changing policies, shifting gears, and the like. This is an administration that has not only been a fervent proponent of unilateralism globally, but intrabureaucratically. In this new Rome, such as it is, all roads lead to the civilian side of the Pentagon (and so to the vice president's office as well.)
"The Pentagon is paying $340,000 a month to the Iraqi political organization led by Ahmad Chalabi, a member of the interim Iraqi government who has close ties to the Bush administration, for 'intelligence collection' about Iraq, according to Defense Department officials."
We're talking, then, of $4 million a year in payments to the man who, it's now clear, was the main source of faulty or out-and-out false intelligence information shuffled to the Pentagon's neocon intelligence operation. These payments continue, as Jehl points out, "a longstanding partnership between the Pentagon and the organization, the Iraqi National Congress, even as the group jockeys for power in a future [Iraqi] government. Internal government reviews have found that much of the information generated by the program before the American invasion last year was useless, misleading or even fabricated."
Chalabi has been Ahmad-on-the-spot in Washington from moment one, as Jim Lobe of IPS reports at Antiwar.com:
"Shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the Pentagon, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith set up two groups, the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and the Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group (CTEG). They were tasked to review raw intelligence to determine if official intelligence agencies had overlooked connections between Shiite and Sunni terrorist groups and between al-Qaeda and secular Arab governments, especially Hussein's.
"The effort, which reportedly included interviewing 'defectors,' several of them supplied by the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an exile group close to neoconservatives who support Israel's Likud Party, closely tracked the agenda of the Defense Policy Group (DPG), chaired by Feith's mentor, Richard Perle.
"The DPG also convened after Sept. 11 with INC leader Ahmad Chalabi to discuss ways in which the terrorist attacks could be tied to Hussein. Neither the State Department nor the CIA was informed about the meeting."
Long before the war, Chalabi was disliked, distrusted, and discredited both by the State Department and the CIA, but he was always the neocons' favorite Iraqi and their chosen future Man in Baghdad. Convicted of bank fraud years ago in Jordan to the tune of $300 million, he found the Bush administration and the press in the months before the war even easier targets than Jordanian banks. Soon after the invasion began, he was even flown by his Pentagon allies with 700 lightly armed supporters into Iraq where, though well positioned and funded, he proved incapable of mobilizing popular support either for his Washington friends or himself. According to fragmentary Iraqi public opinion polls he is probably the least popular member of the American-appointed Governing Council. But it turns out to matter little, since he was, and remains, the rogue the Pentagon and the neocons were determined to replace the rogue regime of Saddam Hussein with.
Amazingly enough, still financially supported by the Pentagon for the "intelligence" he can offer, this "hero in error" is by now poised not just to be a player but possibly the crucial power-wielder in a "sovereign" Iraq -- that is, in the Iraq that would be created once the Bush administration was returned to power. As Newsweek's Christopher Dickey wrote recently in The Master Operator:
"Chalabi is now head of the Governing Council's economic and finance committee. As such he has overseen the appointment of the minister of oil, the minister of finance, the central bank governor, the trade minister, the head of the trade bank and the designated managing director of the largest commercial bank in the country. For the moment, U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer writes the big checks and can veto policies. But all that will change on June 30, the Bush administration's self-imposed deadline for returning sovereignty to an Iraqi government.
"Chalabi's other major source of strength is the De-Baathification Commission, which he heads. Its mandate --to work against former members of Saddam's regime and his Baath Party -- is so wide-ranging that even one of Chalabi's aides calls it 'a government within the government'. Both Iraqi and U.S. officials in Baghdad say it's almost certain that on June 30, the government that does receive sovereignty -- and the purse strings -- will be either the current, appointed council, or some variation on it. Will Chalabi and his people still be in place, still powerful? You can just about bank on it."
In other words, if you follow the money trail, you end up, on the Washington side of things, back at the Pentagon and in Iraq, at the man the Pentagon put in place there. And so Washington's policy, despite the mess that is Iraq, seems almost bizarrely on course. Curiouser and curiouser, as Alice might have said, had she plunged into the Bush administration's version of the Middle Eastern Wonderland.
Item three: We may be ready to turn over "sovereignty" in Iraq, but this administration's definition of sovereignty turns out to be limited indeed. Privatization of the Iraqi economy continues to be a given, whatever government might regain "sovereignty"; and no less a given has been the creation of major, permanent American military bases in the country.
Here, by the way, we find ourselves confronting one of the mysteries of press coverage during the postwar period. As reported in the Engineering News-Record, according to Lt. Col. David (Mark) Holt of the Army Corps of Engineers who has been "tasked with facilities development" in Iraq our base reconstruction program is simply a massive undertaking.
"'Again the numbers are staggering,' Holt says. Most of [the] work is being done through [Halliburton subsidiary] KBR. 'Interesting program in the several billion dollar range,' Holt says."
In the several billion dollar range. Think of that toss-away line and how it defines basic Bush administration policies in Iraq. Several billion dollars are going into the construction of military bases throughout Iraq, some of almost Vietnam-War-era size, and other than one front-page piece in the New York Times in April 2003 just after the war ended, claiming that four major permanent bases -- or as they are now being called, "enduring camps" -- were in the process of being constructed, the issue has gone completely unreported in our press.
I find this remarkable. When you look back, you'll discover that the Pentagon has been planning for the creation of a future Iraqi military of only 40,000 soldiers, relatively lightly armed and without any air force at all, since at least the end of the war, if not before it. Certainly, this was the plan even before L. Paul Bremer demobilized what was left of Saddam's 400,000 man military. And the 40,000 figure and the description of the nature of the force to be built have not, as far as I can tell, varied to this day. Forget "sovereignty," forget "democracy"; all you need to know is this to grasp our plans in Iraq. In such a heavily-armed neighborhood, an army of 40,000 with no air force or heavy weaponry is perhaps a border-patrolling force or a force meant to put down domestic opposition, but not a force meant to defend the country. It's obvious that, as far as the Pentagon and the administration are concerned, our military is clearly the real force being prepared to defend Iraq till hell freezes over -- from a series of permanent bases in that country, backed by a Status of Forces Agreement that, when negotiated with the new ruling body, will put the actions of our troops outside the purview of the local courts.
On the question of which branch of our government was to run "democratic" Iraq, on Chalabi's role in Iraq, and on permanent basing in that country, the Busheviks have really never strayed far from their essential desires, no matter the crisis (and there have been plenty) at hand. So three modest straws, indicating which way the wind is blowing and what future it's blowing towards, if the Bush administration has anything to do with it.
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