Clinton, Israel Share Blame For Peace Talk Failure, Says Film

by Julio Godoy

Charles Enderlin, Israeli correspondent for the French television channel France 2 shows in a 150-minute documentary that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was not the only leader responsible for failure of the peace negotiations with Israel at Camp David in July 2001.

The film, "A Broken Dream," makes the case that accusations against Arafat by U.S. and Israeli officials and in much of the Western media are false.

"The facts show that Arafat had no more responsibility than anybody else in the failure of the peace negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority," Enderlin told IPS.

Enderlin had access to all the protagonists of the Middle East drama, from Arafat to former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and the U.S. mediators in President Clinton's government. On occasions Enderlin himself became mediator between Israelis and Palestinians, offering the offices of his bureau in Jerusalem as a secret meeting place.

A French journalist of Jewish origin, Enderlin has lived in Israel since 1968 and has been covering the Middle East for French and Israeli television and radio since 1971.

Enderlin's film shows that Israeli and Palestinian delegations agreed in the Camp David talks to continue negotiations. "The negotiations of Camp David were only one step in the peace process, and not the end of it," Enderlin says. "For that reason alone you cannot call the Camp David meetings a failure."

Enderlin shows in his film that Arafat met former Israeli Prime Minister Barak at the latter's private home immediately after the Camp David negotiations. Enderlin shows that relations between the leaders at that meeting were warm and friendly, despite the repeated accusations against Arafat by U.S. and Israeli representatives after what was seen as the failure of Camp David.

An Israeli negotiator says on film that relations between Arafat and Barak at that meeting were like those of "fond lovers."

In a book published in the summer, Enderlin showed that Barak's government had earlier planned the Camp David negotiations as a trap to disqualify Arafat and his aides as "unable to make peace with Israel."

U.S. co-ordinator for the Middle East Dennis Ross admits helping Barak give a wrong impression of the role played by Arafat at the Camp David negotiations. He argues that "Barak needed a helping hand to climb up in the opinion polls in Israel."

Enderlin points out that there is practically no printed documentation of the Camp David negotiations other than notes taken by representatives. Proposals made at Camp David were either so-called "non-papers" (unattributed text) or were presented orally.

Enderlin argues that negotiations could have come to a definitive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Authority if only the U.S. government had presented its proposals earlier. The proposals were finally discussed only at the Egyptian seaside resort of Taba in January 2001. President Clinton had presented the new proposals on Dec. 23, 2000 after more than three months of inactivity. The Clinton proposals gave considerable importance to Palestinian demands without putting Israel in insurmountable difficulties.

"Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat is right when he says that negotiations at Taba would have needed only six, seven weeks more to succeed," Enderlin says. But the negotiators did not have this time because on the basis of a misleading analysis of his electoral chances, Barak resigned in February. Once Barak resigned, negotiations ended.

Elections scheduled for May 2001 were brought forward to Feb. 6, 2001. They gave right-wing leader Ariel Sharon a clear victory. Under Sharon no negotiations were possible. "The election of Sharon marked the end of the peace process," Enderlin says.

The film shows how Palestinians asked Barak to ban a visit by Ariel Sharon to the Haram-al-Charif, or the Mount of the Temple, on Sept. 28, 2000. "If Sharon visits Haram-al-Charif only he will laugh and all others will suffer," Saeb Erekat, Palestinian negotiator is shown as telling his Israeli counterparts. Sharon did come -- accompanied by 1,500 Israeli police agents and soldiers. The visit outraged the Arabs, and the second Intifada began the next day.

The documentary illustrates how the peace process begun by Israel and Palestinian representatives in Oslo in 1993 fell apart after Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin was murdered by a right-wing Israeli extremist.

The inability of the peace process to improve the living conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, the repeated suicide attacks by clandestine Palestinian organizations, and the unwillingness of Israeli governments to comply with the Oslo agreements contributed to the failure, the film says.

"With the deterioration of the living conditions of Palestinians, the negotiations became more and more a sort of political seminar that had nothing to do with the reality on the territories," Enderlin says.

Enderlin says a key element in the disillusionment of Palestinian negotiators with Israeli authorities was the decision by Barak's government to withdraw unconditionally from the Golan Heights in May 2000.

The Israeli occupation of this Syrian territory in 1967 provoked repeated attacks against Israel by the Hizbollah. The Golan Heights became the subject of intense negotiations between Barak and Syrian President Hafiz el Assad from December 1999 to March 2000.

Unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights sent the wrong signal to Palestinians, Enderlin says. "From that moment the Palestinians said, 'We keep negotiating a peace agreement with Israel, make concessions and see our people killed, and the only thing that we get is postponement of our goal to be sovereign in our own land.'"

He quotes the president of the Palestinian parliament, Abou Alal, as saying: "The signal the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights sent to the Palestinians is: 'Kill Israelis and you will get the land.'" Enderlin says this view was shared by top Israeli military officers, including Gen. Ouri Saguy, former chief of the Israeli military intelligence.

Enderlin says the question of Palestinian refugees was not a major factor in failure of the negotiations. "It is simply not true that Arafat had demanded the return of 3 million refugees to Palestine," he says. "If an acceptable agreement had been presented on a homeland for Palestinians and on Jerusalem, Arafat would have made major concessions on the question of refugees."

Enderlin worked with Israeli television journalists Dan Setton and Tor Ben Mayor to produce the documentary. France 2 will broadcast the film early next month. Rights to show the film have been acquired by Israeli television, and by several Arab, U.S. and European channels.