India, Pakistan Dispute Over Water Rights Behind War Fever

by Ranjit Devraj

The treaty under which the South Asian neighbors share the waters of the Indus River and its five tributaries -- Ravi, Chenab, Beas, Sutlej and Jhelum -- has so far been hailed internationally as a prime example of successful settlement of a major international river basin conflict.

But much water has flowed under the proverbial bridge in the 42 years since the treaty was signed, including several full-fledged wars over the Himalayan territory of Kashmir that sits strategically on the headwaters of the Indus.

In May 1998, India and Pakistan carried out tit-for-tat nuclear tests.

Following a May 14 suicide attack on an army camp near Jammu, the winter capital of disputed Kashmir state in which 34 people were killed, many of them wives and children of soldiers, India ordered the expulsion of Pakistan's High Commissioner Ashraf Jehangir Qazi. It also further beefed up an already massive troop deployment along the common border.

On May 19, the Cabinet Committee on Security led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee weighed punitive, diplomatic, economic and military measures over and above those it had taken after a suicide squad attempted to blow up Parliament House by driving up in a car laden with explosives in December.

New Delhi had then withdrawn its high commissioner in Islamabad, unilaterally downgraded diplomatic missions in both countries to the level of deputy high commissioner, suspended all rail and road traffic across the border and banned overflights by Pakistani civilian aircraft over Indian territory.

Indicating that it would no longer tolerate a "15-year-old proxy war" waged by Pakistan to wrest control over Kashmir, India also moved close to a million troops to the border. That is considered the biggest military mobilization since World War II, eliciting a mirror response by Pakistan on the other side of the border.

But India stopped short of disturbing the Indus Waters Treaty. The accord has survived full-fledged wars between the two countries in 1965 and 1971 as well as an undeclared but bloody 1999 border war at Kargil on the Line of Control (LoC) that separates Indian Kashmir from the Pakistan-controlled part of the former princely state.

Now, with Pakistan being seen by India to be unwilling or unable to control what it calls "cross-border terrorism," and New Delhi running out of worthwhile counter measures, strategists in this country are once again urging the government to "review" the Indus Basin Treaty, the provisions of which, they say, are detrimental to India's interests anyway.

"The incongruity of unabated terrorist killings in India by Pakistani 'jihadists' while the water lifeline flows uninterrupted to Pakistan from India stares us in the face," said Jasjit Singh, one of the country's foremost strategic analysts and former director of the prestigious think tank, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

Pakistan's nuclear policy says that its "nuclear threshold" would be crossed if India attempts to block shared water resources.

Under the Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistan got exclusive use of waters from the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, which flow westward through Kashmir, while India retained exclusive use of the eastward flowing tributaries, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, which also reach Pakistan but after flowing through Punjab and Himachal Pradesh states.

Singh, who admits that India cannot easily withdraw altogether from a solemn international treaty in which the World Bank was a party, says that it could nevertheless "seriously aim to renegotiate the terms to ensure a greater share of the river waters and, failing that, act unilaterally."

What Singh proposes has huge political appeal in Indian Kashmir, which is scheduled to elect a new assembly in September.

Successive state governments as well as the incumbent National Conference (NC) party government of chief minister Farooq Abdullah have accused New Delhi of bartering away the state's interests in return for exclusive use of waters that irrigate the fertile western state of Punjab, called India's granary.

In 1985, India began construction of the Wular Barrage across the Jhelum River with the aim of improving navigation between Srinagar and Baramulla, especially in the winter months, but this immediately drew protests from Pakistan as violative of the treaty.

India said the construction of the barrage under what is called the Tulbul Navigational Project would benefit Pakistan by regulating water flow through lean and plentiful seasons, but Islamabad took the view that the barrage could equally well be used as strategic weapon.

According to a paper published by Pakistan's Institute of Strategic Studies, control over the Jhelum River would mean a serious threat to Pakistan should India decide to withhold water over an extended period, especially during the dry season.

The paper said control over the Jhelum River would give India "a strategic edge during a military confrontation, enabling it to control the mobility and retreat of Pakistani troops and enhancing the maneuverability of Indian troops."

Another project, the 500-megawatt Baglihar power project on the Chenab River, has also been objected to by Pakistan, although India has pointed out that the treaty allows construction for power generation as long as there is no diversion of water flow.

"Thanks to the treaty we cannot use the waters of the Chenab, Indus or Jhelum and (we) produce badly needed electricity," says Syed Abdul Rashid, minister for power in Kashmir. He has cited expert studies that blame the treaty for depriving the state of a chance to exploit 10,000 megawatts of hydroelectric potential instead of suffering a serious power and water shortage.

Rashid is now busy filing a formal compensation claim with the central government for bartering away Kashmir's share of the Indus waters, while preserving exclusive rights over waters that flow through Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, greatly benefiting these two states.

Downstream in Pakistan, the province of Sindh has been accusing the military regime under Field Marshal Ayub Khan of bartering away through the treaty its share of the three eastern flowing rivers -- Ravi Beas and Sutlej -- to India without its consent or compensation.

Sindhi associations have also accused successive federal governments dominated by Pakistan's Punjab province of appropriating for Punjab the lion's share of the Indus waters through a system of large dams, causing the slow desertification of Sindh province.

Given the number of conflicts that surround the Indus Water Treaty, both international and internal, the wonder is that it was signed at all. Experts refer to a spirit of compromise that prevailed on every side in 1960, one that has since become scarce.